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GAME-THEORETICAL RESOURCE MODEL
OF BALANCED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
Abstract. This article proposes a game-theoretical resource approach to
the modeling of sustainable development processes. Initial system is
considered as an aggregate of various resources and participants
consuming and creating these resources to meet their needs or interests.
The system participants are not divided by economic, environmental and
social subsystems. Their strategies or technologies are aimed at deriving
income from the production and consumption of resources, which in turn
serves to the participant coalition interests. The strategic and cooperative
coalition game built on this basis describes the development process of the
system. Its optimal strategy, which is represented by the Shapley value,
provides the compromise strategy of the system balanced technological
development.
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Introduction
The challenge of finding a sustainable development strategy as proposed by
Agenda 21 (UN, 1992) requires, among other things, finding a compromise among
all the participants of the combined social-ecological-economic system (UN,
2013).
This compromise is usually defined only in the "binary projections" of the
problem thru research of social-economic, ecological-economic and other bilateral
influences. However, the system is characterized by interaction of three players.
And this interaction has no constructive approaches in finding the needed common
compromise of the processes being practically considered. Instead, we find that the
models of the mentioned subsystems are segregated; their components are
estimated on the sustainability of development with different details and objectives
pertaining to the original task ((Bossel, 1999, UN, 2009)).
In (Polumiienko et al., 2013), is presented a game-theoretical model of
sustainable development, based on a multilevel coalition strategic game
(Polumienko, 1992), the optimal situation of which provides the common strategy
of sustainable development. This model is a union of submodels of the social,
environmental and economic systems, but it is too bulky and counter-productive.
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Nevertheless, its analysis gave another foundation for constructive finding of
balanced development strategies presented below.
1. Cooperative Model of Balanced Technological Development
The vital activity of any social-ecological-economic system is based on the
resources which are produced and used by its participants. At least, just this
possibility for the next generations is declared by the Agenda 21 as a sustainable
development.
Suppose Res(tk) is a resource vector of the initial social-ecological-economic
system with the components Resm(tk) at the moment of time tk of the breakdown
of  the  time  interval  [t0,  T],  m  =  1,  ...,  M.  Components  of  the  vector  Res(tk)  are
defined by a higher-level player GІ, for example, by the government, which
analyzes the system, works out development strategies, etc. The resource
components may be described by different known indicator systems.
In contrast to conventional approaches, the system participants that are
identified as lower-level players іÎІ, are not divided by social, ecological or
economic subsystems. In order to serve their needs or interests the players іÎІ
produce and use necessary resources within their environment. Such actions of
them represent their strategies sіÎSі,  iÎI.   Here  Sі is  the  set  of  strategies  of  the
player і, and these strategies are considered as having either a restorative or
destructive effect on the system resources. The permissibility of the strategies is
determined by the player GІ, limiting or stimulating the sets of strategies Sі for all
іÎІ.
The players' strategies are designed to satisfy their interests using the received
payoffs and this characterizes the system development process. The initial goal of
achieving sustainable development requires identification of the participants'
common interest. It may be considered as the augmentation of the common
resources under the condition of their balance preservation.
The players iÎІ within the system are considered as  infinitesimal  ones.  That
is, they cannot influence the entire system individually. To increase this influence
and receive higher income, they unite in coalitions. These coalitions сÎС act as the
single player with a strategy sс,  sсÎSс,  where Sс is the union of the strategies sс.
So, the players may carry out strategies within different unions and receive a share
of their respective payoffs.
Therefore, at the moment of time tk we have the vector sіt(tk) of the coalition
strategies sc, сÎС, which will be named as a situation sіt(tk)ÎSіt(tk), where Sіt(tk)
is the set of all the situations. That is, it is the union of all possible actions of the
system participants at the moment of time tk. So, the payoff or income of the
coalition depends on the situation. Since all situations can vary, determination is
made by taking into account the diversity of the resources. They should be
represented in transferable values for the transmission between the game
participants.
Suppose voll,m and prl,m are the volume and weight (or value) of the m-th
resource type Resl,m(tk) in the l-th region of the country. Let us also assume that
the value
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is the relative volume of the resource m within the region l, 0≤ rsl,m(tk) ≤1. If we
consider rsl,m(tk) instead of the resources Resl,m(tk), then that allows us to unify
substantially different resources. For the sake of simplicity, we will not define the
complete index of the region and will denote it as rsm,і(tk) and rsm,с(tk) –
respectively as the share of resources rsm(tk) held by the player iÎІ and the
coalition сÎС, of which it is a member as,
å
Î
=
ci
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In carrying out the strategies, the coalitions spend some resources and
consume other resources, deducting or adding certain value to their components.
These actions may include savings, production means, natural resources, etc., and
could be either individual or common.
In terms of their strategies, the coalitions may be matched to types of specific
economic activities, intrinsic to the system. This specific classification could be
made by the player GІ on the basis of different systems of indicators describing the
system.  We  suppose  that  coalitions  сÎС and  their  strategies  sсÎSс are  in
compliance with such classification and consider the initial task as the division of
resources between different types of coalitions claiming identical resources.
Thus,  we  have  to  find  a  situation  which  provides  the  balance  between  the
coalitions сÎС within the identical, as well as different types of strategies. Within
the same set of them to which corresponds single coalition, this situation is
regulated by agreements between its participants and by the player GІ - a market,
social sphere and the natural environment. Within different types of strategies –
this is done by finding a balanced situation for the resource components m. In this
case, coalitions сÎС are interested in increasing or retaining their share of the
necessary resource. As an example, this could happen with the required air or
water, and then - during the allocation of the income from the created resource.
Thus, balanced development corresponds to the balance of resources, revenues
of  the  coalitions  from  the  use  of  resources  by  their  components  m,  and  to  the
dependent on the preservation of this balance achievable increase of the cumulative
resources of the system.
Balanced  resource  status  is  determined  by  the  player  GІ on  the  basis  of  the
analysis  of  the  resources  rsm(tk)  and  specific  features  of  the  region.  It  therefore
represents a heuristic evaluation, which. determines a certain initial state of the
system resources, while further analysis is intended to achieve improvement of it.
Let us proceed from the initial state of the resources rsm(t0) , without
determining its balanced state. Balanced state may be considered, for example, as
an increase of the resources on the aggregate of all the components or for each of
them individually. While for negative resources, such as waste, negative values
may be used.
Suppose Arsm,с(sіt(tk)) and Drsm,с(sіt(tk)) - added and spent by the coalition
с values of resources for the component m, m = 1, ..., M, at the moment of time tk,
and
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Arsс(sіt(tk)) and Drsс(sіt(tk)) - their final values. Then the value
rsс(sіt(tk)) = Arsс(sіt(tk)) - Drsс(sіt(tk)) + rsс(tk-1), (2)
reflects the result of implementation of the strategy of the coalition с in the
situation sіt(tk), rsс(tk-1) is the value of rsс(sіt(tk)) at the moment of time tk-1.
Considering that the coalitions are all corresponded to certain types of activities,
instead of the sum Arsс(sіt(tk), its individual summand Arsm,c(sіt(tk)) may be
considered, and thus in (2) we will have this value and the sum of all the resources
spent by the coalition. Proceeding from (2), let's determine a payoff function of the
coalition с in the situation sіt(tk) as
Hс(sіt(tk)) = rsс(sіt(tk)) - rsс(sіt(tk-1)) = Arsm,с(sіt(tk)) - Drsс(sіt(tk)). (3)
For their activities, resources are also needed by the other coalitions сÎС, and their
payoff according to (3) is the result of a certain compromise. Subject to further
development, this compromise is also conditioned by the maximum possible
increase of the total resources during the time interval [t0, T] –
å å
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As a result, we have a coalition game
G = < rsm(tk), С, Sіt(tk), Hc(sіt(tk)), сÎС, m = 1, ..., M, tkÎ[t0, T] >, (4)
which describes the development of the (regional) social-ecological-/economic
system.
The  solution  of  the  game  will  be  a  specific  situation  satisfying  all  the
coalitions, and therefore providing the balanced set of the system development
strategies.
Suppose n is the number of players, І and the coalition С are its sub-aggregate.
The function v, which assigns to each coalition C the highest payoff v(C) (sharing
x = (x1, ..., xn)), which is surely received by it is called a characteristic function of
the game (Danilov, 2002). The aggregate <I, v(C)> is thus called a cooperative
game in the form of a characteristic function if:
xi ³ u,(i) for iÎІ and å
Î
=
Ii
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In contrast to the strategic game (4), where the players' actions in different
coalitions are analyzed, in the cooperative game the coalition players united on the
certain  agreements,  must  act  as  a  single  player  against  the  other  players,  and  the
result of such interaction is analyzed.
Let us determine the function
))((minmax))((minmax) tv(c,
)()()(Sk \c
kctSitkctSt
tsitHtsitH
kkcCk
== . (5)
The following aggregate
GR(tk) = < rs(tk), С, Sіt(tk), v(c,tk), m = 1, ...,M , tkÎ[t0, T] >, (6)
will be considered as a cooperative game with the characteristic function (5), which
is built on the basis of the game (4).
The solution of this game is determined as the Shapley value (Aumann,
Shapley, 1974). It describes what the coalition can achieve after completion of the
game. We can define the sharing corresponding to this Shapley value as the
required balance of resources during the system participants interaction. According
to it the most effective will be the balanced strategies providing the maximum
possible value of the available resources.
These strategies are versatile technologies used by the players and coalitions
in  the  process  of  the  creation  and  consumption  of  the  resources.  An  increase  in
their volume most certainly leads to the improvement and growth of the region's
potential.
Finding a reliably effective way of development is implemented through the
strategies sGIÎSGI (managerial technologies) of the upper-level player GI. This is
accomplished thru strategies of the support or limitation of the technologies used
by the system participants.
Achievement of the balance and growth of the system resources also ensures
the further sustainable existence of the GI itself and the entire system managed by
him. The level of satisfaction with the system state, i.e. the satisfaction of the
player GI interests, can be identified, for example, by the following logical
functions:
.,..,1,10,1,))(),(()G( 1-kkk MmtrstrsPt lm
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Predicates in these amounts may be based on the values of the indicators of
balanced development.
Let's name the aggregate
SD(tk) = < GR(tk), GI, SGI, G(tk), tkÎ[t0, T] >, (7)
as a game-theoretical model of balanced development.
Union of such games by regions of the country, which may be made both at
the level of the players GI, and at the lower level of the game (7), will reflect the
problem of its balanced development. In this case, the task of finding a balance
may be assigned to a player of an even higher level which regulates the behavior of
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the  players  GI  and  their  coalitions  for  the  benefit  of  the  system  by  establishing
legislative rules and other standards. Therefore, this player (the government) will
represent the interests of the country at the international level by advocating the
national interests.
Conclusion
The built model constitutes the basis for the development of balanced development
algorithms; however it allows to make some conclusions even now. As of today,
finding the balance is in conflict with relations determined by the market; the
necessity of stable economic growth of companies, ensuring improvement of the
population welfare, etc. This balance involves the fostering of a conscious
limitation of the volumes of consumption, accumulation, and in a word, the fair
spending and allocation of resources. The need for providing the community with
resources requires substitution of the accumulation interests by the priorities of
creation of diversified and durable utilities of public and individual importance.
None of which is a very common practice at the moment.
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